In this paper, we seek to shed new light on the sources of industrial leadership and catch-up in science-based industries. We propose an evolutionary model which incorporates scientists' training and migration, endogenous R&D decisions and the possibility of funding capital accumulation through debt. The analysis of the model allows us to characterize a robust pattern of industrial catch-up. Likewise, the sensitivity analysis shows which parameters act as pro-catch up factors or slow down the process. The identification of stationary-state conditions of the model helps us to interpret the simulations, and highlights crucial interactions between technology-supporting institutions and market demand at the basis of industrial catch-up. Finally, the robustness analysis reveals further interdependencies among innovation, scientist mobility and demand
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and scientists' migrations at a worldwide level) within one co-evolutionary analytical framework (Malerba, 2006) . Secondly, we study the interactive role of innovation, university research, and training in industrial dynamics by incorporating a Nelson-Phelps type innovation function (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) . Finally, we agree with Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) in that it may be the time to move towards a new generation of evolutionary models. Thus, we propose a model which incorporates fresh theoretical mechanisms, and we analyze it from a standard scenario inspired by the so-called "Asian miracle".
Bearing in mind that we seek to understand the sources of leadership and industrial catchup in science-based sectors, we run the model from the standard scenario, and we characterize a type of catch-up process presenting the following features:
a. The emergent firms enjoy an initial advantage in prices which they manage to transform into technological convergence during the process.
b. For the technological convergence to take place, it is essential that emergent nations can count on support from science-related institutions offering access to the worldwide technological frontier. e. In addition, a sufficient effort in educational expenditure, together with the advantage in R&D productivity and the convergence in salaries, lead to an increase in the share of scientists working at the emergent industries. Then, technological convergence and catch-up occur.
f. Finally, during the initial phases of the process, there are reasons why the emergent firms may have to take on debts. If this is the case, the success of the catch-up process depends on whether they can conveniently avoid problems of insolvency.
Afterwards, we carry out a sensitivity analysis which allows us to detail which parameters act as pro-catch-up factors and which slow down or even prevent catch-up. We also present 4 a robustness analysis which shows that our results are solid. Additionally, we obtain some mathematical results that guide the design and interpretation of the simulations. These formal results highlight new properties of the model. Specifically, we identify some stationary-state conditions revealing that technology-supporting institutions and market demand interact in a crucial way at the basis of industrial catch-up.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we outline an overview of the dynamics and we present some formal results. Section 4, is devoted to the computational analysis. Finally, we summarize our conclusions.
The Model
In order to simplify the model's presentation, we will classify our assumptions into five subsections: competitiveness, demand, growth, financing and innovation.
The Firms' Competitiveness
Let us assume that there are n ) ,..., 1 ( n i = firms, each one with a different national identity, competing at a worldwide level in a science-based sector. There is one firm per nation, so we can identify the representative firm of nation i with the i-th national industry.
We assume that the firms compete over price 1 ) (t p i and product performance ) (t x i (quality, reliability, size, speed, precision, etc.) . Regarding prices, we will assume that firms set prices applying a margin to the unit cost (larger margins for greater market powers).
Denoting the margin as a function of the firm's market share by )) ( ( t s m i and the total cost per output unit by ) (t c i , we assume that: For formal convenience, we will consider the following pricing routine which verifies the aforementioned conditions (Fatas-Villafranca and Saura, 2004 
This formula captures the fact that consumers value both high levels of performance and low prices. The subjective relativity implied by the terms "high" and "low" is quantified using the average across the different products, whilst the trade-off between performance and price is regulated by parameter α (the price-performance sensitivity of demand).
Demand Transformation
There is demand-driven production and growth in our model. Regarding the demand-side of the market, we consider that the global demand ( ) (t Q d ) grows at a constant and exogenous rate g > 0, starting out from an initial level ).
is the proportion of global demand supplied by firm i at moment t -that is, its market share-we can see that the instantaneous demand of firm i will be:
If we consider that the consumers/users interact among themselves, observing each other and disseminating information regarding prices and performances of different products, we can assume that there will be a gradual process of demand transformation. That is, consumers will withdraw their demand from certain firms and pass it on to others with a higher level of competitiveness ) (t (4) and (5) we can derive the rate d i g at which demand for product i grows:
Thus, it is clear that those firms with higher than average levels of competitiveness will tend to capture a greater proportion of the demand, thus reaching above-average demand growth rates
Production and Growth
Let us see how production and growth fit the evolution of demand. Starting out from a supply-demand equilibrium for each firm 3 , ) 0
, we assume that each firm's growth rate follows the growth rate of its demand, given by (6). Hence, if we assume that all firms produce in accordance with technology
the following must be fulfilled:
Taking (6) into account, the previous expression can be written as:
That is, the growth of physical capital 4 ( ) (t K i ) -and, therefore, of the output-in each firm fits the growth of its demand in such a way that, at all times,
difference in the perceived competitiveness of the two products. 3 For simplicity, we assume market-clearing and we do not consider the possibility of start-ups. 4 We assume that the capital does not depreciate, which does not alter the results significantly.
it is clear from (4) and (7) that
Financing

R&D Spending
We now assume that once firms have covered their costs, they need to finance both their R&D activities and their investment in physical capital. Regarding R&D, we assume that the firms finance these activities with current profits; that is to say, they do not resort to external financing for these expenses. Previous contributions in the literature (see e.g. Chiao, 2002) associate this behavior with the uncertainty of R&D.
To be specific, we assume that the firms devote a proportion )
of their current profits to R&D, so that firm i 's R&D spending at t will be:
Clearly, ) (t r i is a firm-specific operating routine. According to Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) 
Debt and Physical Investment
Regarding physical investment, we assume that firms devote the necessary proportion of their current profits (free of R&D expenses) to finance the growth of i K . That is, they finance it as much as possible with their own funds before resorting to debt for any remaining needs. This is seen in the following investment function:
Considering equations (8) and (11) 
Finally, the total costs of each firm will include production costs 5 and financial costs. If we denote the debt to capital ratio of each firm by
Innovation and Institutions
Innovation
Let us denote by institutions favor basic knowledge creation (national universities, public agencies and labs, industry-science interfaces, etc.). Given this expanding frontier, we will assume, as in Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
can be identified with the productivity of R&D.
Institutions: The Markets for Scientists
We will consider that ) (t H i is determined by the supply and demand of scientists in each firm/national industry. Moreover, we assume that supply and demand fit instantaneously due to the flexible evolution of the scientific salary ( ) (t w i ) in each nation.
If we consider that firms devote their R&D budgets to hiring scientists at a price given by the respective national scientific salary, the demand of scientists by firm i will be given by:
The supply of scientists will come from two sources: firstly, those scientists trained by the 5 We assume that the total production costs per unit of capital (including capital rental) are equal to 1.
i-th national university system that join the corresponding i-firm; secondly, those scientists that decide to migrate to firm i attracted by monetary and non-monetary considerations.
National university systems
For the sake of simplicity we consider that the amount of scientists trained in disciplines relevant for the industry, who finalize their training in nation i at any time )) ( ( t y i , coincides with the volume of public resources )) ( ( t B i devoted to training in this discipline in the i-th national university system. If we assume that this university budget grows linearly, we obtain:
It can be seen that both the policy parameter , 
Thus, we define the attractiveness of a country i as follows:
A nation/firm is perceived more attractive the higher the salaries it pays and the higher its R&D productivity. Like in equation (3), the subjective relativity implied by the term "higher" is modulated using the average across firms, whilst the trade-off between monetary and non-monetary considerations is regulated by the parameter ε (which represents scientists' relative sensitivity to non-monetary considerations).
We model the movement of mobile scientists assuming that they will emigrate from their current country i only if there are other countries that are more attractive than theirs; when this is the case, they will emigrate from i to j at a rate proportional to the difference in attractiveness, i.e. a rate proportional to (a j -a i ). These assumptions at the micro level give rise to the following equation at the macro level (see 
where parameter ζ controls the sensitivity of the immigration ratio ) (t i υ to differences in the attractiveness of each country. Thus, equation (18) establishes that those firms from specific nations which pay scientists better, or which offer better conditions for developing their activities, will attract more mobile scientists than the others.
Scientists' wages
Assuming market clearing at any time, the following condition must be fulfilled:
Note that the first term in the right hand side of equation (19) , refers to the share of the total pool of mobile scientists that decide to emigrate to country i. From (16) and (19) we can obtain the dynamics of the national scientific salary which guarantees market clearing in (19):
3 Overview of the dynamics The variables that are more closely related to scientist mobility are represented towards the left, whilst the variables more related to the product market appear towards the right. These two subsystems affect each other in a number of ways. Thus, there are several negative feedback loops (red arrows) that favor the stability of various variables. For example, 12 higher R&D productivities z i have a positive effect on performance x i , but the increase in performance diminishes the gap that separates the technological level from the technological frontier; thus, it lowers R&D productivity (FB1, Fig. 1) . Similarly, higher competitiveness has a positive effect on market shares, which lead to higher prices, which in turn imply lower competitiveness (FB2, Fig. 1 ). Finally, greater salaries attract mobile scientists, thus increasing the number of scientists, and favoring lower salaries (FB3, Fig.   1 ). Given the complexity of the model, we have carried out the analysis mainly through simulations. We have also conducted a mathematical analysis to identify various properties of the stationary points of the system. The mathematical analysis has guided both the design and the interpretation of our simulation experiments. Here we summarize some properties of the stationary states (see proofs in the appendix).
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In any stationary state 6 , individual firms are either out of the market or, if they manage to hold a positive market share, then, in the long run, it must be fulfilled that:
a) the proportion of scientists working for them equals their country's immigration ratio (
b) their R&D productivity is constant, proportional to the expansion rate of their technological frontier, and inversely proportional to the share of scientists working for them (
), and c) their product performance grows exponentially according to the following equation:
The simulations reported below -which considers more than 120 000 runs-reveal that the The mathematical analysis does not indicate which one of the stationary states will be approached in any particular run. Thus, two crucial questions remain to be answered: 1) What factors determine whether one particular firm will manage to sustain a positive market share in the long run or, alternatively, will be pushed away from the market?
2) Among those firms that manage to survive in the market, what factors make some of them more successful than others in the long run?
These two questions are answered below, taking the standard scenario as departure point, and analyzing more than 120 000 computer simulations centered on this scenario.
Computational Analysis
Now, taking into account the stationary-state conditions obtained in section 3, and
considering that we seek to analyze the sources of catch-up and leadership in science-based sectors, we set out a baseline parametric scenario for the computational analysis of the 6 That is, any state of the system where the relative position of firms (concerning market shares, immigration ratios, and working scientists shares) remains constant. Formally, ,...,
14 model. This standard scenario is inspired by certain features of the so-called "Asian miracle" (during the last third of the 20 th C.). At this point, one methodological remark is due: our model is not a "history-friendly" model (Malerba et al. 2008) ; it is at such a level of abstraction that this kind of analysis would be inappropriate. We merely start out from a simplified version of a certain case to set up a starting point for our analysis. Note also that some of the values in the standard setting do not depend on the chosen episode, but rather on certain common-sense considerations and reality-based impressions of how specific mechanisms in the model ought to behave.
Once we have set out the standard scenario in 4.1, we run the model in 4.2. We shall see 
The Standard Scenario
During the last third of the 20 th Century, a number of Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan) experienced intense processes of economic growth. One important factor behind this "Asian miracle" was the capacity of these countries to assimilate leading technologies. Technological assimilation was so intense that some Asian firms reached significant market positions in worldwide high-tech sectors (Mowery and Nelson, 1999) .
In order to explain this episode, Stiglitz (1996) , Nelson and Pack (1999) or Amsden (2001) have pointed to certain facts which we shall use as a reference for our standard scenario:
1. The Asian countries achieved high savings rates and were able to channel these domestic resources towards the accumulation of capital in high-tech sectors. were designed to raise domestic technological capabilities up to the frontier levels (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007) . These centers and their close relationships with industrial R&D acted as focuses of attraction for foreign-trained scientists. Now, we shall see how it is possible to set out a standard setting which captures these facts, in an abstract and simplified way. We propose the standard setting shown in Table 1 : ). In Table 1 we also assume that
Likewise, fact 1 appears in Table 1 Table 1 ; that is, a high rate of interest and a short repayment period. These are plausible financial conditions in high-tech sectors due to the high risk associated to these activities.
Fact 3 is reflected in Table 1 by the budget that nation 3 devotes to its university system. This budget -given the size of industry 3 ( 02
)-is significantly higher than its competitors'. Moreover, in Table 1 we assume that the annual budgetary increase is identical for all 3 nations . ,
Since the initial size of firm 3 is only about % 10 of its rivals', we are assuming that the emergent nation makes a significant budgetary effort to consolidate its position in the strategic sector.
Regarding facts 4 and 5 , in Table 1 we have considered that ) 0 ( Hence we assume that the technological possibilities are the same for all three national industries throughout the process. This feature of the standard setting indicates that the emergent nation maintains institutional capabilities throughout the process, which allow it to access technological opportunities similar to those of its competitors. As we shall see in the simulations, these parametric values create the conditions for many foreign-trained scientists to consider the possibility of working in the emergent firm.
Finally, we assume that the initial immigration ratios match the shares of scientists trained in the first iteration. More precisely, we assume 
Simulation of the Standard Scenario
Starting out from Table 1 , we run the model and obtain the simulation results presented in
Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5. All the simulation runs reported in this paper can be replicated using the applet provided in the supplementary material. competitiveness that enable firm 3 to gain market share steadily. Firm 3 manages to approach the (higher) product performance of its competitors because, all along the convergence process, firm 3's R&D productivity is greater than its competitors'. This greater R&D productivity contributes to increase product performance directly, and also indirectly, by attracting mobile scientists. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 , which shows that the share of total scientists working in firm 3 grows uninterruptedly.
Let us explain in detail the above-mentioned convergence process: from (3) and (5) it is clear that the convergence process is driven by the evolution of prices and performance in the different firms. Regarding prices, from Table 1 , (1) and (14), it can be seen that firm 3 19 sets lower prices than its rivals. For this reason, it starts to gain market share (see Fig. 2 ).
However, this initial advantage regarding prices is not definitive for 3 reasons: i) As firm 3 gains market share, its price tends to approach that of its rivals -see (1).
ii) Equations (12) and (13) show that a time will arrive when firm 3 will have to take on debt. This fact will wear down the price advantage of the firm. We show in Fig.   4 how firm 3 increases its debt/capital ratio during the first part of the process. According to (12) and (13), the reasons for firm 3 to take on debt are: firstly, the intense growth rate of the sector g = 0.05; secondly, the high rate initially gains market share -see Fig. 2 ; thirdly, the low initial profit of firm 3 -see Table 1 and (2); and, finally, firm 3's increase in its R&D to profits ratio -see (10).
iii) Despite the initial price advantage, we can see in Table 1 that firm 3 starts out from
. This disadvantage could have thwarted catch-up in Fig. 2 , but firm 3 manages to improve its product to match the level of its rivals' -see (15).
According to equation (15), firm 3 has two sources for improving its performance: the R&D productivity, and the proportion of scientists working at the emergent firm.
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(a) Regarding R&D productivity ) ( 3 t z , it is greater than that of the other firms during the catch-up process (see the conditions in Table 1 
(b) The proportion of scientists, h 3 (t) depends on both the national university systems and the international migration flows. In Table 1 it is clear that mobility is not high,
, so the domestic University funding (18) we know that the R&D productivity in the emergent firm acts as a non-monetary attractor of highly-skilled labor. Therefore, ) ( 3 t z explains, partly, the convergence in Fig. 3 - (9), (8), (10) and (2) we can see that the first stationary-state condition in section 3 is verified, so that
To sum up, the analysis explained above allows us to list the following characteristics of the catch-up process generated from the standard scenario:
1) The emergent firm 3 enjoys an initial advantage in prices, which manages to transform into convergence in performance over the catch-up process.
2) For technological convergence to take place, it is essential that the emergent nation can count on support from science-related institutions giving it access to the worldwide technological frontier ( ) (t T i common i ∀ ; see also the next section).
3) The previous characteristic means that firm 3 enjoys an advantage in R&D productivity. At the same time, we have seen how this firm manages to transform this advantage into convergence in salaries over the process.
4) The convergence in salaries is possible thanks to the gradual increase in R&D spending by the emergent firm.
5) The effort made in educational expenditure by the emergent nation, together with its capacity to attract scientists, allow for a gradual rise in the share of scientists working in the emergent firm.
6) During the initial phase of the process, the emergent firm has to resort to debt to finance its intense growth. However, as the catch-up process advances, firm 3 manages to pay off its debt, thus avoiding insolvency.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of the dynamics obtained from the standard scenario to changes in the main parameters. The stationary-state conditions described in section 3, together with a few additional mathematical results, will be of help for our analysis. Let us start by analyzing the influence of the technological frontiers, ) (t T i , since they play a crucial role in the model. From eq. (15) it is clear that, ceteris paribus, firms with greater technological frontiers enjoy higher R&D productivities and can enhance the 22 performance of their products beyond their competitors'. This competitive edge allows them to capture a greater share of the market. As we will see, this advantage is so important that, in any stationary state, any difference in the technological frontier between two surviving firms with the same unit cost necessarily implies a persistent difference in their market shares (see appendix). In particular, a situation where all firms share the market equally can be stable only if the technological frontier is the same for all of them.
Conversely, if all firms have a common technological frontier (like in the standard scenario), surviving firms end up dividing the market in equal shares. This statement, which is supported by the robustness analysis summarized in the next section, allows us to go deeper into the mechanisms that underlie the catch-up process.
More precisely, in order to understand the specific influences of T i (0) and λ i -the parameters that shape the technological frontier of a firm-, let us define ex ij , the relative edge in performance of firm i over firm j, as: We show in the appendix that in any stationary state, the following condition must hold between any two firms in the market with equal unit costs:
In particular, this condition reveals that in any stationary state, a greater product performance implies a greater market-share. And, as explained above, the greater the technological frontier is, the greater the performance. Here we focus on the role of T i (0) and λ i in giving an arbitrary firm i, the edge that will make it rise above its competitors. Departing from the standard scenario, Fig. 6 shows the time series of firm 3's market share
for different values of T 3 (0). Clearly, a greater T 3 (0) implies a greater market share s 3 ; it is also apparent that differences in T i (0) do not preclude the perpetual coexistence of various firms in the market. For instance, when T 3 (0) = 1.3 (and T 1 (0) = T 2 (0) = 1), the model reaches a stationary situation where firm 3 -with the greatest levels of product performance-captures 62% of the market, whilst the other two firms -with lower levels of performance-set lower prices and manage to retain 19% of the market each. In fact, if the market appreciates low prices sufficiently (i.e. if α is high enough), it may be the case that regardless of how large T 3 (0) is, there will always be room for the other two firms to compete in prices. This crucial interaction between the technological frontier and the profile of market demand (α) can be clearly seen in Fig. 7 , which shows the time series of firm 3's market share for different values of T 3 (0), departing from the standard scenario with α = 0.9. The effect of λ i is more fundamental, since differences in this parameter induce differences in performance that can grow indefinitely. In particular, this means that -ceteris paribusthe surviving firm with the greatest λ i will end up with the maximum edge in performance ex ij over any other firm j. As an example, consider Fig 8, which shows the time series of market shares in the standard scenario where λ 3 has been changed from λ 3 = 0.01 (= λ 1 = λ 2 )
to λ 3 = 0.011 (> λ 1 = λ 2 ). In the end, the emergent firm 3 gets hold of the whole market. Whether the absolute advantage in performance induced by having the greatest λ i will translate in complete dominance of the market or not, is a question that depends on the profile of the market demand (α). Drawing on the expressions of ex ij , and es ij , it is straightforward that:
where n is the number of firms in the model (n = 3 in the standard scenario). Using that result and considering eq. Having understood that differences in technological frontiers are responsible for persistent differences in market shares, we now turn to study the influence of the other parameters.
These parameters do not have an impact on how surviving firms share the market in the long run, but they do influence a) which specific firms manage to survive, and b) how quickly surviving firms reach their long-run market-share. Regarding the former question,
consider Table 2 , which shows, for each parameter, the range of values within which the emergent firm 3 ends up approaching its stationary market share of 1/3, assuming the other parameters retain its value in the standard scenario. Table 2 shows that most changes in one parameter do not prevent the emergent firm from reaching its stationary share of 1/3. Thus, the result that firm 3 catches up is robust to changes in only one parameter at a time. 
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Regarding question b) above, we present in Table 3 Table 3 . Elasticity of t 3 with respect to the parameters in the standard scenario. Elasticities have been calculated computing the effect of a 10% change of each parameter on t 3 (D 3 was changed from 0 to 1). The elasticity with respect to λ i and T i refer to simultaneous changes in all firms.
In Table 3 , positive signs show that the larger the parametric value is, the larger t 3 is.
Negative signs indicate that the larger the value of the considered parameter, the earlier the convergence process ends. The signs of the elasticities in Table 3 indicate that the process of convergence accelerates -that is to say, t 3 is lower-, the higher the values of α , ε and 3 b . Likewise, the positive sign of the elasticity of σ shows that the higher the international mobility of scientists -that is, the higher (1-σ) is-, the lower t 3 is. That is, the international mobility of scientists, the price/performance sensitivity of demand, the sensitivity of scientists to non-monetary considerations and the budgetary effort of nation 3 act as procatch-up factors. On the other hand, the positive signs of the elasticities of g, χ and D 3 (0) in Table 3 show clearly that these parameters slow down the convergence process.
It is interesting to interpret some of the mechanisms which underlie the elasticities in Table   3 . Thus, the negative elasticity of α reveals the pro-catch-up effect of this parameter. The reason is that the higher the value of α -the price/performance sensitivity of demand-, the more intensely the emergent firm can make the most of its initial advantage in prices. This means that firm 3 gains market share first, converges its R&D spending and salaries more quickly, and rapidly raises its share of scientists. The latter fact favors the convergence of the firm in performance and accelerates the process of catch-up.
The parameter ε also acts as a pro-catch-up factor. To be specific, ε indicates the sensitivity 28 of scientists to non-monetary factors. Its pro-catch-up character is explained by the fact that the higher the value of this parameter, the more scientists will be captured by the emergent nation, which makes the most of its initial attractiveness in questions of R&D productivity.
This will accelerate the convergence in performance and catch-up.
Our attention is also drawn to the high intensity of the effects of σ (see Table 3 ). Clearly, the higher the international mobility of scientists (the higher 1-σ), the lower t 3 is. This is so because the emergent industry captures a greater volume of foreign scientists, making the most of its R&D productivity, and converges in performance with ease.
Finally, as we have seen, there are three factors which seem to delay significantly the catchup process. The first one is g. Thus, the greater the growth rate of the sector, the more difficulties the emergent firm experiences in completing the catching-up. This is so as the emergent firm is obliged to take on more and more debt, the higher the growth rate experienced in the initial phase. This rate depends on g -see (8). The costs of this debt will wear down the initial advantage in prices, and the market share capture is delayed while the catch-up process is slowed down.
The other factors are χ and D 3 (0). To be specific, the higher the value of both parametersthat is, the higher the initial level of debt in the emergent firm and the shorter the repayment period of the debt-, the greater the financial costs of firm 3. This wears down its initial advantage in prices and slows down the catch-up process.
Robustness Analysis
In this section we assess the robustness of the catch-up process by studying a wide range of parameter combinations around the standard setting. To be specific, we have run 121500 simulations of our model, one for each possible combination of the parameter values shown in Extreme values of α and ε were included for the sake of completeness, but our analysis is focused on the 43740 simulation runs where α oe (0,1) and ε oe (0,1), which are the ones that lie within the boundaries of the model. Also, note that we conducted the whole robustness analysis assuming that the technological frontier is the same for the three firms, since the effect of differences in technological frontiers has been studied mathematically in depth in the previous section. With these conditions in place, the simulation analysis confirms that surviving firms always end up dividing the market in equal shares: in all 43740 simulation runs, surviving firms converged to the same market share, i.e. the outcome at time t = 1000 was convergence of the three firms, convergence of two firms, or monopoly (see Fig. 10 ). And taking limits when t goes to infinity, we obtain that in a stationary situation the proportion of scientists working in industry i must equal the immigration ratio of that country in the long run, i.e. ε : R&D productivity/wage sensitivity of scientists .
σ : stay in country ratio.
ζ : inmigration-ratio-sensitivity
